I have long had a problem with the interpretation and application of the results of toxicity tests, which remains unresolved today. It is this.
The correlation between the effects measured in a supposedly useful test with a model system (such as an animal or an in vitro system) and the likely effects in the object of interest (such as a humanbeing) must fall between 50% (the equivalent of tossing a coin, so a relationship below this would be useless) and 100% (which is unattainable, given the inevitably of significant differences between the test system and the object system, and variation in the responses in both of them). Bearing this in mind, how do we interpret and apply the result of an individual test? If, say, the correlation were 70%, which would be more than it is usually possible to obtain, how could we know, when we tested the next drug or chemical, whether the result was in the 70% agreement category or in the 30% disagreement category? This is an important question, as the answer to it has many implications of commercial, social and political concern, including: whether a chemical should be used and, if so, in what kinds of products and circumstances, and with what precautions, and whether a drug is likely to be sufficiently efficacious and sufficiently lacking in side-effects to be acceptable for use in treating patients.
The central problem is that, while administrators, company lawyers, politicians, etc., and the general public, want clear yes-or-no answers on whether something is "safe" to use, science and testing cannot provide such certainty, but can only hope to make a reasonable judgement about the probability that it will be sufficiently safe.
The conclusion that is eventually reached will usually involve consideration of the results of a number of different tests, along with many other kinds of available information, in a weight-of-evidence (WoE) approach. It also involves risk assessment and risk management, cost-benefit analysis, and, particularly in the case of medicines, postmarketing surveillance.
This WoE approach is unavoidable, but it involves the temptation to believe that the combined consideration of uncertainties will lead to greater overall certainty. This is a somewhat biased description of meta-analysis, an approach used in evidence-based medicine for combining the findings from independent studies, in order, for example, to obtain a precise estimate of treatment effect, taking into account the outcomes of a series of clinical trials. However, as is emphasised by Crombie and Davies in a What is…? comment, 1 "the validity of the meta-analysis depends on the quality of the systematic review on which it is based". For example, the relevance and reliability of the individual studies must be considered, and a balanced assessment of their deficiencies must be made, as must decisions about the relative weights to be given to them in the meta-analysis.
These are very important points, since, despite many grand attempts to make WoE reviews impersonal, objective and subject to rules, they inevitably involve strong subjective elements. I was reminded of this while watching an episode of Endeavour, a TV series about the young detective, Morse, who was the main character in a highlysuccessful earlier series about later stages in his career. Morse turns to his boss and says something like this -"How you look at something determines what you see". This reminded me of a famous quotation by Anaïs Nin, "We don't see things as they are, we see things as we are", also put like this in the Talmud: "We see the world, not as it is, but as we are".
In other words, the outcome of any evaluation is influenced by the attitudes, biases, characters, culture, experience, expertise, responsibilities, vested interests, etc., of the evaluators themselves. In the case of animal tests, one kind of evaluator will tend to concentrate on the benefits to humans, to their companies and to science, while another kind of evaluator will focus on the costs to the animals, their suffering, and their deaths.
I That all sounds pretty familiar, I thought, so I followed up the concept and came across Shah and Dawney's seven principles of behavioural economics, 3 which are:
1. Other people's behaviour matters: People are encouraged to continue to do things when they feel other people approve of their behaviour.
2. Habits are important: People do many things without consciously thinking about them, and these habits are hard to change.
3. People are motivated to 'do the right thing'.
4. People's self-expectations influence how they behave.
5. People are loss-averse and hang on to what they consider 'theirs'.
6. People are bad at computation when making decisions: They cannot calculate probabilities well and worry too much about unlikely events, and they are strongly influenced by how the problem/information is presented to them.
7. People need to feel involved and effective to make a change: Just giving people the incentives and information is not necessarily enough.
Again, I felt that this provided food for thought for those involved in the world of animal experimentation and alternatives, who are unlikely to be more rational and efficient, or less prone to error, than those involved in the world of economics. Endeavour Morse linked his comment to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, so I have been looking into that as well. According to Wikipedia: 4 
In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle is any of a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties of a particle known as complementary variables, such as position x and momentum p (mass × velocity), can be known simultaneously. For instance, the more precisely the position of some particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa. The original heuristic argument that such a limit should exist was given by Werner Heisenberg in 1927.
I think that what this means is that, knowing one thing can prevent knowledge of another thing, whether or not we are aware of it. For example, perception and reality do not fit well together, since what you consider to be real is based on your perception of reality, rather than on the absolute reality itself. Whether the glass is perceived as half-empty or half-full can be the cause of pessimism (it's half-empty) or optimism (it's half-full).
There are many jokes about Heisenberg's principle. For example, when out driving, Heisenberg is stopped by a traffic policeman, who says, "Do you know how fast you were going?" Heisenberg replies, "No, but I know where I am." Of course, to see the joke, you have to understand the uncertainty principle.
However, while thinking of how to bring this editorial to a close on a more serious note, I came across a very moving chapter on Knowledge or Certainty, in Jacob Bronowski's book, The Ascent of Man, 5 based on his 1973 BBC TV series, which is listed among the 100 best TV programmes ever made. I can only quote a small part of it here: Thus, as we consider the challenges with which we are faced, we must act with tolerance of the views sincerely held by others, with a realistic appreciation of the limitations of our scientific knowledge, and a recognition of the complexity of the world in which we operate. We cannot totally escape from the influences which affect the way we look at things and the judgements we make. Above all, we must be wary of ever feeling absolutely certain -"It cannot be acceptable to take decisions and make policies on the basis of what appears to be knowable, but is, in reality, unknowable." 6 Tests are not merely something that we apply to animals or in vitro systems, they inescapably involve the testing of ourselves. 
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